The Professional Corporation by Pearson, Garry A.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 41 Number 3 Article 1 
1964 
The Professional Corporation 
Garry A. Pearson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Pearson, Garry A. (1964) "The Professional Corporation," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 41 : No. 3 , Article 
1. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol41/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
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THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
GARRY A. PEARSON*
During the reign of the second King of Rome, Numa Pompilius
(715-672 B.C.), there existed a heated dispute between the Romans
and the Sabines, both occupants of the newly created City of Rome.
As a political solution to an apparently irreconcilable conflict, Numa
resorted to the already ancient tactic of "divide and conquer," but
Numa's method was unique; he separated the townsfolk into clearly
definable economic groups with an independent existence within
the group that transcended the life of the members. Romans and
Sabines alike formed the nucleus of what many textwriters describe
as the first recorded instance of the use of the corporation.1
So too, in the twentieth century, a unique form of organization
has arisen, again as a political solution to a conflict-this time
between the tax gatherer and the gathered. It is the professional
corporation, a form which has been labeled and treated as a corpo-
ration by the state government, attacked by the federal goverhment,
criticized by some as unprofessional, approved by august bodies as
thoroughly respectable, and given a collection of so many varying
attributes as to be a creature of doubtful legitimacy.
On July 1, 1963 the Professional Corporation Act became law
in North Dakota. 2 It appeared that the Internal Revenue Service
would bless this newborn creature, since the only positive expression
of opinion at that time was a letter ruling favoring a professional
corporation for a group of doctors in Connecticut." On December
17, 1963, however, the Internal Revenue Service proposed certain
regulations4 casting doubt in this area of the law; these regulations
were then substantially adopted on February 2, 1965.5 The stage
*Arnason & Pearson, Grand Forks, North Dakota. B.S.B.A. 1956, J.D. 1958, North
Dakota. C.P.A., 1957. Trial Attorney, Tax Division, United States Department of Justice,
1958-1961.
1. 1 PLUTARCH, LivEs 151-152 (Clough ed. 1906).
2. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-31 (Supp. 1963).
3. "The clinic is incorporated under the laws of Connecticut, and Is taxable as a
corporation under the provisions of '54 Code Reg. § 301. 7701-2(a)(1), since it has more
corporate characteristics than non-corporate characteristics. Doctor-members are employees
because of the substantial nature, regularity and continuity of the services performed and
the authority vested in the clinic's Board of Directors." 4 P-H 1961 FED. TAx SERV.
54753.
4. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, 28 Fed. Reg. 13751 (1963).
5. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1965), as amended, T.D. 6797, 1 P-H 1965 Fi. TAx
Ssav. 3203.
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is now set for the inevitable attack on those regulations, and
practitioners must be aware of the great uncertainty which attends
the formation of such a corporation under the present state of the
law.
Few readers will fail to identify the garden-variety corporation
and may well wonder at their supposedly more specialized brethren.
Legerdemain is all too often exalted in federal taxation, and nowhere
is it better exemplified than in differentiating between similar
organizations. Since Congress has imposed varying rates, exemptions
and deductions for varying entities, it has been necessary to define
the characteristics of each form of organization. Taxation being an
essentially practical matter, the substance of a thing must control
over its form; 6 hence, a corporation is something more than a
group with a charter from the state. For federal taxation purposes,
"the term 'corporation' includes associations, joint-stock companies,
and insurance companies. '"
Congress has thus by definition broadened the scope of the term
"corporation" to include groups which would not, at common law,
be termed as such. This obviously left much to be desired and
required, at a relatively early time, Supreme Court interpretation.
In Morrissey v. Commissioner," a group of investors formed a
trust for the purpose of operating a golf course, subdividing, selling,
renting real estate, and managing the property, and bound them-
selves to a trust agreement which would continue for twenty-five
years. Two thousand preferred and common shares were authorized
to evidence the beneficial interests. The trust declared the trustees
powerless to bind the beneficiaries personally by any act or default.
The Commissioner insisted that this organization should be taxed
as a corporation, essentially for the reason that the described enter-
prise exhibited pronounced corporate attributes, and the Supreme
Court agreed. In the Court's opinion, a corporation
1. "holds the title to the property . .
2. "furnishes the opportunity for centralized management
through representatives of the members ..."
3. "may be secure from termination or interruption by the
death of the owners . . ."
4. "facilitates ...the transfer of beneficial interests . .
and
5. "permits the limitation of personal liability ...
Several companion cases decided with Morrissey confirmed the same
philosophy. 10 The Commissioner thereafter issued orders to his
6. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
7. INT. R Ev. CODE of 1954, § 7701(3).
8. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
9. Id. at $59.
10. Swanson v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 362 (1935) ; Helvering v. Combs, 296 U.S. 365(1935) ; Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert, 296 U.S. 369 (1935). Accord, Lewis & Co. v. Com-
missioner, 301 U.S. 385 (1937).
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agents to apply an objective nation-wide standard which relied upon
a mechanical test, namely, does the entity have more of the
characteristics native to a corporation than a partnership.1 During
this period tax rates on individuals and corporations alike were
relatively low' 2 and the impetus for profit-sharing plans, death
benefits, deferred income plans and other sophisticated tax saving
approaches did not arrive until the steeply progressive rates of
World War II.
In Pelton v. Commissioner's the government won a case it still
seeks to live down. A group of physicians and surgeons organized
a medical clinic, in trust, for the practice of medicine, specifying
centralized management, a degree of transferability of interests,
associates engaged in the practice of a profession for profit, and
continuity of interest. Because of the striking similarities with
Morrissey and its companion cases, the Commissioner proposed to
tax the medical clinic as a corporation, while the doctors contended
that the trust income should be taxed to the beneficiaries, since
Illinois law prevented them from practicing in the corporate form.14
The Court of Appeals considered that Morrissey, decided only a few
weeks earlier, was dispositive of the petitioner's claim, as state
law is of no importance for purposes of taxation.'
Following the introduction of the steeply progressive income tax
rates of 1942,16 ways were sought by professional persons to level
out their income, or provide a method of accumulating funds for
retirement with tax consequences. In 1938 Congress passed what
became section 165 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,11 the
predecessor of the present section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, which created the tax exemption for profit sharing and
pension plans designed to benefit "employees." This obviously
operated to the disadvantage of the self-employed, and particularly
those who could not incorporate and thereby become "employees"
of their own corporations.
Most of these advantages have today become fairly well known.
For example, contributions to a profit sharing plan qualified under
section 401, for the benefit of employees, may be deducted from
corporate income to the maximum amount of fifteen per cent of
the employee's gross wages; while in trust these contributions earn
interest and dividends free of tax, and the return of the trust fund
is taxed at capital gains rates when the employee is disabled or
retired and his rate is low.' s In a similar fashion the corporate
11. Mim. 4483, XV-2 CUM. BULL. 175 (1936).
12. See Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, §§ 11-13, 52 Stat. 447.
13. 82 F.2d 473 (1936).
14. People v. United Medical Service, 362 Il1. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936).
15. Supra note 13, at 476.
16. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 12(a), 53 Stat. 5, as amended by Revenue
Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 103, 56 Stat. 798.
17. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 165(a), 52 Stat. 518. Similar acts have existed
since 1916. See, e.g., Act of September 8, 1916, ch. 463, J 2(b), 39 Stat. 757.
18. INT. itay. Conn of 1954, § 401(a).
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employee can enter into a contract with the corporation to pay his
income over a period beyond his earning years, hence deferring
the tax and leveling income, perhaps postponing it until retirement
when rates become much lower and additional exemptions are avail-
able. 9 If desired, the 5,000 dollar death benefit can be given tax
free to the widow of a corporate employee, 20 and tax free accident
and health programs, 21 group insurance for larger groups and
disability contracts are available.
22
In 1954 a group of Montana doctors formed a clinic under Articles
of Association which, in general, provided that the Association would
have perpetual existence, centralized management, a form of limited
liability, and several associates for the carrying on of a business
with the intent of dividing the profits therefrom. In effect, this
group sought to tailor-make its organization to fit the mold cast by
Morrissey, Pelton and similar cases. From a judgment for the
doctors, 23 the government appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which
affirmed. 24 In both the trial court and the Court of Appeals the
government urged the proposition that local law, that is, the Montana
prohibition of the corporate practice of medicine,2 5 was the deter-
mining factor, an argument that the Commissioner had successfully
resisted in Pelton.2 6 The Court of Appeals refused to overturn
twenty or more years of practice, and answered: 2
7
The Government's contention, based on the proposition that
because, under local law, a corporation is not allowed to
practice medicine, the group is not an association, would
introduce an element of uncertainty which neither the courts
nor the regulations have recognized.
At least three of the five tests attributed to Morrissey were found
to be present in the Association in Kintner. The Association held
title to property, had centralized management, and was not termi-
nated by death or withdrawal of an owner; but it lacked free
transferability of interests and limited liability, although only the
members were liable for professional misconduct. The permanence
of the organization was stressed and, on the whole, both the trial
and reviewing court considered the organization sufficiently
analogous to a corporation. In Galt v. United States,28 virtually the
19. A "cash-basis taxpayer" reports income when received. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1
CUM. BULL. 174.
20. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, 8 101(b).
21. Id. § 106.
22. Id. h8 105(c), 105(e).
23. Kintner v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 976 (D. Mont. 1952).
24. United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
25. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-104 (1955). In 1963 Montana enacted the Profes-
sional Service Corporation Act, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-2101 to -2116 (Supp. 1963),
and added the "rendering of professional services" to the list of approved corporate pur-
poses. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 15-104(33).
26. Supra note 13.
27. Supra note 24, at 423.
28. 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
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same set of facts resulted in another victory for a medical clinic
and significantly, no appeal was taken.
On November 15, 1960 the Commissioner promulgated new regu-
lations defining and classifying taxpayers.29 These regulations were
obviously precipitated by the decisions in Kintner and Galt, since
they expressly based the distinctions between corporations, partner-
ships, associations and the like on local law. For example, the
regulations conclude that an organization or association lacking a
corporate charter in a state which has adopted the Uniform Partner-
ship Act 0 could not qualify as a corporation; death or resignation
of a member effects a termination of the entity and hence prevents
centralization of management and continuity of life, since any mem-
ber of a partnership or association governed by partnership law
can effectively block group action simply by resigning or threatening
to resign."' It may be believed that such regulations, if valid,
would have compelled a different result in Morrissey, Pelton and
other pre-Kintner decisions.
These regulations spawned the next step, the wholesale enact-
ment of professional corporation statutes.3 2 The proponents of such
legislation convincingly argued that since local law is the test to
which the courts must look under the new regulations, local law
will be changed to satisfy the new regulations. The mountain had
come to Mohammed. 3 In the first published controversy a group
of doctors in Connecticut formed a professional corporation for the
practice of medicine, and requested a revenue ruling on their tax
status. The Commissioner approved that group for corporate tax
treatment,3 4 based upon local law, i.e., Connecticut's Medical Group
Clinic Corporations Act.35 However, the scene suddenly became
silent; no further rulings were made and it became apparent that
the Commissioner was about to take further action. That action
came on December 17, 1963 when the present regulations were
proposed.36 These were publicly heard during March, 1964 and
29. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960).
30. The Uniform Partnership Act has been adopted in thirty-nine states, the District
of Columbia, the Virgin Islands and Guam. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-05 to -09 (1960).
31. Moreover, these regulations state: "Nevertheless, if, notwithstanding such agree-
ment [of association setting a fixed life as in the Morrissey case], any member has the
power under local law to dissolve the organization, the organization lacks continuity oflife. Accordingly, a general partnership subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform
Partnership Act and a limited partnership subject to a statute corresponding to the Uni-form Limited Partnership Act both lack continuity of life." (Emphasis added). Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(b)(3) (1960).
32. Such acts, varying In form and coverage, are law in thirty-three states. 1 P-H
1965 FED. TAx SERv. 3216.
33. It has become increasingly popular to solve federal tax problems with local statutes.Witness the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-24-02 (1960), designed
to preserve the gift tax exemption.
34. "The clinic Is incorporated under the laws of Connecticut, and is taxable as a
corporation under the provisions of '54 Code Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1), since it has more
corporate characteristics than non-corporate characteristics. Doctor-members are employees
because of the substantial nature, regularity and continuity of the services performed
and the authority vested In the clinic's Board of Directors." 4 P-H 1961 FED. TAX SERV.
54753.
35. CONN. GEN. STAT. RZv. § 33-180 to -182 (1962).
36. Proposed Treas. Reg. 3 301.7701-2, Z8 Fed. Reg. 13751 (1963).
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became final on February 2, 1965.-1 In truth these regulations seek
to return to the doctrine of the Morrissey case; lip service is given
to local law, but a federal standard is applied when determining
whether or not a professional group will qualify for corporate tax
treatment. For example, the regulations state:
Nevertheless, the labels applied by local law to organizations,
which now or hereafter may be authorized by local law, are
in and of themselves of no importance in the classification
of such organizations for the purposes of taxation under the
Internal Revenue Code. Thus a professional service organi-
zation, formed under the law of a State authorizing the
formation by one or more persons of a so-called professional
service corporation, would not be classified for the purposes
of taxation as a "corporation" merely because the organi-
zation was so labeled under local law. See Morrissey et al.
v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935) .... 8
Moreover, although a measure of central control may exist
in a professional service organization, the managers of a
professional service organization in which a member retains
traditional professional responsibility cannot have the con-
tinuing exclusive authority to determine all of the matters
described in the preceding sentence .... Therefore, centrali-
zation of management does not exist in such a professional
service organization. 9
If local law, applicable regulations, or professional ethics do
not permit a member of a professional service organization
to share in its profits unless an employment relationship
exists between him and the organization, and if in such case
he or his estate is required to dispose of his interest in the
organization if the employment relationship terminates, the
continuing existence of the organization depends upon the
willingness of its remaining members, if any, either to agree,
by prior arrangement or at the time of such termination,
to acquire his interest or to employ his proposed successor.
. . . Consequently, such a professional service organization
lacks continuity of life.4 0
In many other ways the regulations would deny corporate status
to the professional corporation, but it would not serve our purposes
to repeat them here. It seems fair to conclude that the regulations
were written deliberately to foreclose forever any hope of establishing
legitimacy to such an entity. For this reason it would indeed be
an impetuous counsel who would advise a client to organize under
the North Dakota Act without bracing one's self for battle.
It must be remembered, on the other hand, that the Commissioner
37. Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-2 (1965), as amended, T.D. 6797, 1 P-H 1965 FED. TAX
SERV. 1U 3203.
38. Id. § 301.7701-1(c).
39. Id. § 301.7701-2(h)(3).
40. Id. § 301.7701-2(h)(2).
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cannot rewrite the law; his regulations must be a fair diagnosis of
what the law is, and when he exceeds the duty of interpretation and
commences to write new law, his regulations will be held invalid.41
The new regulations strain to incorporate the logic of the Morrissey
case with the result desired by the Revenue Service in Kintner, and
the two may well be irreconcilable. In any event the practitioner
must realize that no early determination will be available.
We have now turned full circle, from federal test to local law
test and back to federal test. No one can predict the fate of the
professional corporation movement, if one may call it that, but one
can certainly bemoan the uncertainty attendant to this entire field.
For more than ten years the up and down controversy has raged,
thereby rendering unstable a vehicle for transacting a business which
must have, above all attributes, the advantage of stability. More-
over, one must mourn the effort expended in unrealistic pursuits;
a professional corporation may not be in fact a corporation because
of the limitations of professional ethics 42, but the professional person
merely seeks to join his non-professional brother who can easily
enjoy the advantages of the corporate form.
41. Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129 (1936).
42. Yet one should not lose sight of the fact that several professions permit incorpor-
ation under the Business Corporation Act. For example, architects, engineers and pharma-
cists combine in this form with the approval of their professional societies. Note also that
the North Dakota Professional Corporation Act does not include the rendering of a
service which, prior to the passage of the act, "could not be performed by a corporation."(Emphasis added). N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-31-01(1) (Supp. 1963).
